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 Governments, policymakers, and donors attach a 
great deal of importance to poverty outreach—the 
extent to which MFIs serve poor and disadvantaged 
locations—when evaluating microfinance institutions 
(MFIs). One may ask why this consideration is 
important. First, for many policymakers and planners, 
regional or area-specific growth and equity outcomes 
are important. Second, there is a widespread but 
implicit assumption that because MFIs serve the poor, 
by implication they serve the poor everywhere, but this 
cannot be taken for granted. As with most other 
industries, the very nature of the products and tech-
nology, and the constellation of incentives within MFIs 
may be such that certain locations are systematically 
favored while others are systematically avoided. 
Studies of the location of services by commercial 
banks in Bangladesh and India find that they generally 
favor economically well-endowed areas. Is this the 
case with MFIs as well? For example, what kinds of 
tensions arise between organizational goals, perform-
ance standards, and operational requirements, and how 
do these affect placement of branches? Once branches 
have been established, are levels of client coverage 
similar across branches? What factors drive the differ-
ences? Answers to such questions assist policymakers 
and project managers to recognize operational con-
straints and improve product design and service 
delivery. Third, a better knowledge of the determinants 
of placement assists in disentangling program effects 
from location effects and hence becomes useful in the 




With the above considerations in mind, IFPRI 
undertook a study of the service placement of three 
major NGOs in Bangladesh: the Association of Social 
Advancement (ASA), the Bangladesh Rural Advance-
ment Committee (BRAC), and Proshika Manobik 
Unnayan Kendra (PROSHIKA). All three institutions 
have large nationwide networks of branches and pro-
vide credit on the basis of group liability to a closely 
targeted population consisting of poor households. 
Three-hundred-and-ninety-one thanas from all over 
Bangladesh were considered for the study. Data on the 
thana-wide existence of branches of three institutions 
and their client density (number of clients per 1,000 
persons in the thana) were collected for the year 1994 
and then mapped on thana-wide indicators of poverty 
level and infrastructure to discern placement. These 
indicators were collected from statistical yearbooks 
published by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and 




 Since profit making is not the principal aim of the 
NGOs, standard economic principles provide little 
guidance in analyzing determinants of their service 
placement rules. However, two important pointers are 
available. First, all three NGOs came into being princi-
pally in response to the challenge of delivering basic 
social services to an impoverished population that had 
been devastated by war. Second, all three NGOs 
received—or continue to receive—funding from gov-
ernments and donors, and are likely to be bound by 
various conditions related primarily to maintaining 
minimum standards of financial performance (e.g., 
caps on delinquency rates and administrative costs) 
and of positive program impact. These conditions led 
the authors to hypothesize that there are four expected 
determinants of branch placement and client coverage 
that can be empirically tested using the collected data. 
1. Poverty-targeting. All three NGOs claim to be 
guided, first and foremost, by a common mission 
to serve the poorest in the rural areas. All three 
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institutions also claim to have clear, strict, and 
well-enforced poverty-based eligibility rules. If 
this is the case, these institutions should be target-
ing locations with above-average poverty levels.  
2. Expected level of demand for credit services. This 
consideration is important for two reasons. First, 
fixed costs associated with branch establishment 
imply that when demand is lower than some mini-
mum threshold level, credit delivery becomes pro-
hibitively costly to administer. Second, the 
marginal impact of financial services on partici-
pating households is likely to be highest in areas 
with strongest credit demand. For these reasons, 
branch and service placement decisions are likely 
to respond to the level of physical and market 
infrastructure and the general economic buoyancy 
of the area, all of which fuel credit demand. 
3. Cost of supplying services. While per-unit costs of 
supplying services are important, the underlying 
relationship is not as clear-cut as it is in profit-
seeking institutions because of the various types of 
subsidies received. Nonetheless, there are at least 
three related considerations. First, credit trans-
actions raise security concerns, and proximity to 
police stations or other law-enforcement establish-
ments is important. Proximity to branches of com-
mercial banks (which tend to locate in urban 
areas) is also important, since the NGOs do not 
provide banking services. Third, to the extent that 
salaries and other compensations do not reward 
appointments in more remote locations, managers 
are likely to prefer locations that have fairly well-
developed services (education, market, health). If 
these considerations are significant in the decision 
to place branches, placement will be higher in 
thanas that have such services. 
4. Perceived risk. Maintaining high repayment rates 
is of utmost importance to all three institutions in 
securing continued access to donor grants and 
subsidies, and they are thus likely to avoid areas 
where marginal returns from new microenterprises 
are low enough to affect repayment rates. They are 
also likely to avoid areas that are highly sus-
ceptible to natural disasters such as flooding and 
other covariate risks. Some tension between 





Results indicate that even though the placement of 
branches of NGO institutions were attentive to poverty 
considerations, branches were nevertheless more likely 
to be established in locations with better access to 
transport and communication infrastructure. Hence it 
appears that NGO services are geared more toward the 
poor who reside in relatively well-developed areas 
rather than the poor in more remote and less developed 
regions. Client density of existing branches, however, 
did not exhibit such a feature and actually tended to be 
better in less favorable and more “distressed” 
locations. 
Greater concentration of branches in more developed 
areas may in part be because in these locations, the 
marginal impact of credit services is the greatest. For 
example, loans for financing production of highly 
market-dependent outputs, e.g., commercial crops and 
other nonfarm microenterprises, are less suitable for 
remote areas. Moreover, banking services become 
especially risky in remote areas where covariance in 
household incomes is likely to be very high. In such 
areas, the high repayment rates necessary to maintain 
NGOs’ access to donor funding are harder to achieve. 
Furthermore, the unavailability of commercial banks 
limits financial operations in remote or poor locations. 
Hence, NGOs may follow a strategy of placing fewer 
branches in distressed areas, but with each of these 
branches serving a larger number of clients. The 
tension between poverty targeting and ensuring 
adequate financial performance is thus quite evident in 




If efforts to simultaneously reach the poor, maximize 
marginal impact of services, and keep loan repayment 
rates high introduce considerable tension in service 
placement decisions, solutions for reducing this 
tension may lie in innovative lending technologies that 
reduce transaction costs to both lenders and borrowers 
and increase marginal returns of loans to the poor in 
disadvantaged locations. Three specific recommenda-
tions are suggested: (1) set in place an institutional 
mechanism that provides freedom and incentive for 
front-line managers (rather than headquarters staff) to 
assess market potential and constraints and identify, 
design, and price services accordingly; (2) create addi-
tional incentives for NGOs to locate branches in 
remote areas where access to basic social services and 
economic infrastructure is lacking; and (3) introduce 
mobile banking, where remote locations are served by 
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